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Communists and Compromisers:
Explaining Divergences within Turkish
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Brian Mello
 
I. Communists and Compromisers: Explaining
Divergences within Turkish Labor Activism, 1960-1980
1 During the 1960s and 1970s two labor union confederations dominated the landscape of
state-labor  relations  in  Turkey.  However,  while  both  confederations  faced  similar
political and economic contexts, the Confederation of Turkish Labor Unions [Türk-İş] and
the Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions [DİSK] initially engaged in radically
different strategies in pursuit of their political and economic goals. Generally, while Türk-
İş engaged in a more conflict-averse business unionism, DİSK promoted a more radical
political agenda that was inspired by socialist ideas and the belief that political unionism
was  crucial  for  bringing about  greater  democratization and socioeconomic  justice  in
Turkey. This article focuses on why these two confederations, facing similar incentive
structures, pursued divergent political paths.
2 In this article, I utilize a Weberian framework (one adapted in more recent rationalist
theory) that first specifies “the rational course” of political action, and then focuses on
why the actual course differed (Weber 1969:  32).  For example,  in Consent,  Dissent,  and
Patriotism,  Margaret  Levi  advocates  a  methodological  approach to explaining political
outcomes that  begins with the assumption that  “rational  actors strategically interact
until they reach an equilibrium outcome from which no one has an incentive to deviate”
(1998:7).  The articulation of  such equilibrium points  allows scholars  to examine how
exogenous shocks or changes in specified independent variables are likely to affect the
behavior of particular political actors. In a sense, then, the analysis that follows takes its
inspiration  from  the  analytic  narrative  approach  advocated  by  Bates,  Grief,  Levi,
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Rosenthal, and Weingast (1998). Essentially, analytic narratives seek to explain particular
political outcomes by blending insights from game theory and rationalist arguments with
rich  historical  narratives.  Levi  argues,  “A  concern  with  the  game  logic  builds  both
equilibrium analysis and institutions into the model. The new economic institutionalism
clarifies what constrains or facilitates actions and what role information and beliefs play
in affecting behavior (1997: 7). For Levi, “Model building begins by identifying the key
actors, positing the ends they are maximizing or optimizing, and then explaining their
behavior by reference to the constraints and strategic interactions that influence their
choices” (1997: 9). Insofar as actors’ change behavior, such changes may result from the
emergence of new rules or norms that inform the choices made by a group of actors, and
may  reflect  institutional  arrangements  that  reinforce  these  new  norms  (1997: 10).
Consequently, the goal of both this article and of the advocates of analytic narratives is to
provide parsimonious frameworks to explain particular problems that can account for
actual historical complexity. Moreover, as in the analytical narratives offered by Bates et
al, this study focuses less on structural explanations for political outcomes and more on
“the  interplay  between  strategic  actors”  (1998: 12).  However,  more  so  than  typical
rationalist  theories,  the  argument  advanced  in  this  article  draws  from  theoretical
frameworks that focus on how ideas, identities, and conceptions of fairness influence the
behavior of political actors and underpin instances of collective action. 
3 Weber’s categories of social action represent a useful starting point for simplifying and
explaining  otherwise  complex  phenomena.  However,  because  Weber’s  categories  are
ideal  types  that  are  never  entirely  reflected  by  the  reality  of  politics,  I  supplement
Weberian insights with insights from the work of E.P. Thompson, Douglass North, and
James March and Johan Olsen.  Thus, I argue that the ideological preferences of labor
union leaders and activists partially determines the strategic behavior of the labor side of
state-labor  relations.  Moreover,  I  demonstrate  that  the  split  in  the  Turkish  labor
movement,  upon which the second half  of  this  article  focuses,  was  premised on the
emergence of new institutions with alternative logics of appropriateness. 
4 I  begin by examining some of  the most  important  approaches in political  science to
explaining  state-labor  interactions.  Here,  I  focus  on  the  extent  to  which  these
interactions involve rational, goal-oriented strategic behaviour, and the extent to which
ideological  predispositions  often  trumps  such  cost-benefit  rationality.  Of  particular
concern here, is the extent to which the incentive structures created by state actions lead
labor movement activists to behave in expected ways. Subsequently, I turn to the case of
the Turkish labor movement. Examining labor movement texts, instances of collective
action,  and secondary literature,  I  evaluate the extent to which the schism that tore
through the Turkish labor movement in the 1960s was the result of new understandings
and  identities  (of  the  worker  and  the  union),  and  how  these  new  understandings
subsequently shaped different sets of political choices. I conclude by suggesting how the
history of  the labor movement in Turkey can shed light  on other instances of  labor
movement schism in general, and in particular, on how ideology matters in the context of
divergences in labor movement activism. 
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II. Explaining State Labor Relations: Rationality and/or
Values
5 I use as a starting point for analyzing and explaining state-labor interaction, Collier and
Collier’s (1991) Shaping the Political Arena. Like Collier and Collier, I highlight how labor
movement activism is as much a political as it is an economic phenomenon. For Collier
and Collier,  the  period surrounding and following states’  attempts  to  legitimate  and
shape the emergence of an institutional labor movement marks a critical juncture, or a
period  of  dynamic  change  with  long-term political  consequences.  On the  whole,  the
politics of labor movements involves a dual dilemma: On the one hand, labor can be a
crucial player in a state’s need for legitimation, participation, and compliance, but an
organized working class also poses a potential threat to other sources of political and
economic power. Conversely, unions can benefit a great deal from state support, but close
ties can risk organized labor becoming merely a tool of the state. For Collier and Collier,
there are, thus, two main reasons for labor incorporation: to prevent worker protest from
becoming too radical and to expand and extend the modern, activist state. They identify
two types of labor incorporation: state and party incorporation.1 
6 For my purposes here, the key insight from Collier and Collier’s analysis is the idea that
state-labor relations involve a dual dilemma regarding how state and movement actors
should  behave.  How  decisions  are  reached  by  the  actors  involved  in  this  process
determines the shape of state-labor relations in a given context. As a starting point, if we
assume that state actors and labor movement activists are guided by what Weber calls
rational,  goal-oriented conduct,  then we can develop an initial  picture of  what these
decisions ought to look like. This involves articulating the basic goals or preferences state
and labor actors are likely to have.
7 I  assume the basic  goals  and preferences  of  labor  movement  actors  are:  First,  to  be
recognized as a legitimate player in the political and economic system. This may involve
such  things  as  a  consultative  role  in  political  decision  making,  protection  against
employer  backlash,  legal  protections  for  the  right  to  strike  and  organize,  etc.  And,
second, to secure pecuniary benefits to members, for as Mancur Olson (1971) notes, this
appears to be a critical  element in overcoming collective action problems.2 As Daniel
Cornfield and Bill Fletcher (1998) point out, these goals can best be achieved by securing
state allies. This is the case, Cornfield and Fletcher note, because labor’s bargaining power
– its ability to achieve its preferred outcomes – depends highly on the ability to gain state
allies that can provide assistance in labor movements’ battles with their key antagonists,
capital. So, we can assume that labor movements’ political strategies will seek, insofar as
political opportunities are possible, to maximize allies in the state. This means either
organizing  a  takeover  of  the  state  (a  rare  phenomenon,  indeed)  or  more  likely  a
moderation of tactics in exchange for increased access and protection. 
8 State actors, for their part, I assume want to obtain the legitimacy that working class
support  can  offer  without  giving  up  too  much  decision  making  power  to  labor
movements. Thus, state actors, it can be assumed, prefer to adopt pro-labor policies that
can incorporate unions into the existing political order, especially if this means creating
the incentives for labor movements to forego more militant and destabilizing political
activism. On the other hand, it can be assumed that, in the face of militant labor activism
that  threatens  their  hold  on political  power,  state  actors  prefer  to  adopt  repressive
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policies that create disincentives (high costs, jail time, death from police action, closure
of unions, etc.) for labor movements to engage in militant actions. Indeed, we know that
when it comes to dealing with social movement activism, states often simultaneously
engage  in  negotiation  and  repression,  with  the  goal  of  incorporating  or  co-opting
movement activists into existing political channels and at the same time alienating and
neutralizing radical elements.3 
9 Thus, if both state and labor movement actors exhibit goal-oriented behavior, we can
hypothesize that if states are willing and capable of adopting pro-labor policies, labor
movements  will  be  willing  to  moderate  their  rhetoric,  strategies  and  tactics.
Furthermore, it is possible to map out the most rational course of state-labor actions.
When labor activists organize and mobilize for collective action, their activism can either
take a militant or a non-militant form. Following Maria Victoria Murillo, labor militancy
is  defined  as  “organized  protests  disrupting  production  or  governance”  (2001:  11).4
Subsequently state actors (governmental officials and political parties), can choose either
to adopt pro-labor policies, to ignore labor activism, or to engage in policies of labor
repression.  Once a  governmental  choice  of  action is  made, labor  movement  activists
respond, unless of course labor repression is overwhelmingly successful. 
10  For purposes of simplification, I assume labor activists will choose to engage in either
militant actions or non-militant actions depending on their expectations that state actors
will help advance labor goals. State actors will want to use labor both to advance their
electoral goals, and to advance the legitimacy of the state.5 However, state actors will not
want to give up too much power and control to labor. In short, state actors will try to
prevent the emergence of a powerful and autonomous labor movement.6 Clearly, insofar
as these interactions become regularized,  trust  gets established,  expectations become
more credible, and state-labor interactions routinized. 
11  Deciphering the payoffs  for  particular  choice combinations requires  considering the
state and labor movement actors separately. In theory, the labor activists will prefer to
achieve  policy  gains  through  non-militant  activism,  because  although  it  can  be  an
effective means for strengthening solidarity and working class identity, militant activism
tends to be costly, divisive, and to mobilize opposition.7 In theory, state actors will never
want to grant policy concessions for militant labor activism.8 Rather, state actors will
want to promote labor participation contingent upon this participation supporting the
state  actor’s  electoral,  financial,  and ideological  goals.  As  a  result,  we should expect
rational, goal-oriented state-labor interaction generally to converge on strategies of non-
militant activism and (relatively) pro-labor policies. 
12 If,  on the other hand,  labor activists exhibit  a different type of  behavior,  then these
patterns of interaction won’t hold. Toward this end, Max Weber (1969) identified four
types of social conduct. In addition to goal-oriented rationality, which is based on an
expectation that  others  will  act  rationally,  he  suggests  some social  conduct  exhibits
value-related rationality, some is affective, and some traditional. Traditional conduct is
based on repetition, and over time can become more meaningfully oriented, or value-
related. Affective conduct is motivated by emotional connection and feelings. It, too, can
become value-related over time. Value-related conduct, therefore, is conduct “classified
by the conscious belief in the absolute worth of the conduct” (1969: 59). Social action that
exhibits value-related rationality is distinguished by the “conscious formulation of the
ultimate values governing such conduct” (1969: 60).  Weber summarizes,  “Examples of
pure value-related conduct  would be the behavior  of  persons who,  regardless  of  the
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consequences, conduct themselves in such a way as to put into practice their conviction
of what appears to them to be required by duty, honor, beauty, religiosity, piety, or the
importance of a ‘cause,’ no matter what its goal” (1969: 60-61). Therefore, where labor
movement  activists  exhibit  value-related  behavior,  we  should  expect  to  find  a
commitment to an articulated vision and course of  action regardless  of  positive and
negative changes in the incentive structures that movements face.  
13 Weber’s framework, though parsimonious, perhaps draws too stark a distinction between
behavior that exhibits the characteristics of cost-benefit analysis and behavior that is
ideologically motivated. As with most Weberian ideal-type categories,  it  is difficult to
definitively categorize the behavior of actual social actors as entirely value-related, or
entirely goal oriented. All goal-oriented behavior is, in fact, shaped by larger ideological
predispositions. This point has been made, in slightly different ways by E.P. Thomson’s
(1971) conceptualization of the moral economy, March and Olsen’s (2004, 2008) discussion
of the logics of appropriateness, and Douglass North’s (1981) discussion of the role of
ideology in explaining stability and change in economic history.  
14 For Thompson, instances of collective action or social protest (particularly among the
poor  in  England  about  whom  Thompson’s  analysis  focused)  were  almost  always
underpinned by a legitimizing notion, which “was so strong that it overrode motives of
fear or deference” (1971: 78). Thompson refers to this legitimizing notion as “the moral
economy,” insofar as it embodies an effort to defend a set of social norms distinguishing
legitimate from illegitimate behavior. Where public policies, new institutions, or broader
structural changes violated these norms, social protest represented a rational response of
the  poor.  Subsequently,  James  Scott  (1976)  applied  an  understanding  of  the  moral
economy of the peasant (one based on a subsistence ethic and not a profit-maximization
ethic) to explain patterns of peasant rebellion in Southeast Asia. Thus, peasant behavior
that may appear irrational given a set of behaviors prescribed by profit-maximization is
nonetheless rational given the set of values advanced by the subsistence ethic. 
15 For North,  neo-classical  economic theory,  which focuses  on narrow conceptions self-
interested behavior characterized by cost-benefit calculations cannot effectively account
for “behavior in which calculated self interest is not the motivating factor” (1981: 11).
Thus, North suggests an understanding of the role of ideology in shaping behavior is
especially  important  when explaining why there  exists  social  cooperation and group
participation despite incentives to be a free rider. For North, ideological motivations are
critical for understanding both economic change and stability. As he states, obedience to
the rules of society is better explained by beliefs in their legitimacy than by individual
calculations of the costs and benefits of obeying rather than shirking rules. Indeed, there
are certainly many benefits that can be derived from disobedience, but, as North points
out, cheating, shirking, and stealing are far less common than an individualistic calculus
of costs and benefits might suggest (1981:  11).  On the other hand,  the willingness of
individuals to participate in collective action often requires the emergence of a common
understanding that existing practices are unfair or illegitimate, and that collective action
is  required  in  order  to  address  the  sources  of  this  unfairness.  According  to  North,
individuals are moved to alter their ideologies when “inconsistencies between experience
and  ideologies”  accumulate  (1981:  49).  Moreover,  in  considering  various  forms  of
collective action North declares, “I am not arguing that these actions are irrational – only
that the calculation of benefits and costs that we employ is too limited to catch other
elements in people’s decision-making processes” (1981: 46). 
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16 For North,  “ideologies are intellectual  efforts to rationalize the behavioral  pattern of
individuals  and groups” (1981:  48).  Ideologies,  as  North understands  them,  involve a
comprehensive “world-view,” which allows for simplified decision making (1981: 49), and
conceptions of fairness, which allow for moral and ethical judgments (1981: 49). For my
purposes, the most relevant insights offered by North’s discussion of ideology is in his
overview  of  the  characteristics  of  a  counter  ideology:  “If  the  dominant  ideology  is
designed to get people to conceive of justice as coextensive with the existing rules and,
accordingly, to obey them out of a sense of morality, the objective of a successful counter
ideology is to convince people not only that the observed injustices are an inherent part
of  the  existing  system  but  also  that  a  just  system  can  come  about  only  by  active
participation of individuals to alter the system” (1981: 54). 
17 March and Olsen’s recent articulation of what they term the logic of appropriateness can
further  help to  clarify  how ideological  considerations  shape political  behavior.  Their
argument is that, “most of the time humans take reasoned action by trying to answer
three elementary questions: what kind of situation is this? What kind of person am I?
What does a person such as I do in a situation such as this” (2004: 4)? In essence, March
and  Olsen  argue  that  individuals’  actions  are  more  often  shaped  by  institutional
perspectives  than by  self-interested rational  calculations.  For  March and Olsen,  “the
processes  of  reasoning  are  not  primarily  connected  to  anticipation  of  future
consequences as they are in most conceptions of rationality” (2004: 4). Rather, “to act
appropriately is to proceed according to the institutional practices of a collectivity, based
on mutual, and often tacit, understandings of what is true, reasonable, natural, right, and
good” (2004: 4). Insofar as institutions create rules that “prescribe, more or less precisely,
what is appropriate action” (2004: 7), the emergence of alternative institutions within the
Turkish labor movement implies a rejection of the rules developed during the prior years
of institution building in Turkey. 
18 Alternative institutions can emerge for a number of reasons, including transformations in
previously fragmented political systems that cause once separate institutional settings
(each with its  own logic  of  appropriateness)  to  come into  contact  with one another
– often in profoundly irreconcilable ways. Alternative institutions may also emerge from
larger  social,  political,  or  economic  transformations  that  alter  the  experiences  of
individuals  in ways that reduce the salience or legitimacy of  what was once deemed
“appropriate behavior” (2004: 15). For instance, March and Olsen point out, “Increased
mobility or massive migration across large geographical and cultural differences may
likewise  create  collisions  that  challenge  established  frames  of  reference  and
institutionalized  routines.  Such  collisions,”  they  write,  “may  generate  destructive
conflicts,  but they may also generate rethinking,  search,  learning,  and adaptation by
changing  the  participants’  reference  groups,  aspiration-levels,  and  causal
understandings” (2004: 19). 
19 What each of these approaches share is a belief that collective political action is shaped
by  larger  values,  conceptions  of  fairness,  and  identities.  By  drawing  from  these
approaches, I seek to explain the split within the Turkish labor movement in the 1960s by
focusing on how alternative ideologies emerged within the Turkish labor movement, in
conjunction with alternative institutions.9 Insofar as the existing economic policies and
the regime of labor relations in Turkey was increasingly seen as unfair, the founding
members of DİSK developed a counter ideology characterized by a more radical political
agenda that called for greater direct action on the part of Turkish workers. Thus, what
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emerged in Turkey was an ideologically fragmented labor movement, where different
institutions  maintained  (at  times)  distinct  goals  for  the  political  and  economic
development  of  Turkey,  distinct  conceptions  of  the  role  labor  unions  should  play
politically,  and  as  a  result,  different  levels  of  collective  political  action.  In  essence,
different logics of appropriateness emerged within various factions of the Turkish labor
movement during the mid-1960s. Thus, the historical narrative that follows seeks to shed
light on what kinds of new understandings and identities (of the worker and the union)
were formed, and how these new logics of appropriateness subsequently shaped different
sets  of  political  choices.  The reality  of  divergence with the Turkish labor movement
during the 1960s and 1970s suggests that the focus on state-labor interaction outlined
above requires a supplemental  focus on the strategic competition within the Turkish
labor movement. Thus, increasingly during the period under consideration, conflict and
competition  within  the  Turkish  labor  movement  helped  to  shape  and  reinforce  the
schism between DİSK and Türk-İş.  I  consider  the importance of  this  competition for
explaining the trajectory of the Turkish labor movement within the narrative offered
below.
 
III. Division in the Turkish Labor Movement
20  Widespread labor activism in Turkey is a fairly recent phenomenon. Though unions were
present and active stretching back into the Ottoman Empire,  the early Turkish state
feared  class  antagonism  and  placed  strict  limits  on  labor  movement  organization.10
Several aspects of the political and economic climate of the 1950s, however, helped to
open opportunities for the growth of the Turkish labor movement. Foremost, political
opportunities for working class mobilization during the 1950s were created by a marked
trend toward urbanization and industrialization.  In addition, after the on-set of multi-
party competitive elections beginning in 1946, appeals to the concerns of labor unions
and working class voters became increasingly common.  Within the context of the Cold
War, international support for the development of Turkish labor unions was provided, in
part, by the AFL-CIO and the U.S. Agency for International Development.  Finally, on an
organizational level, perhaps the most important development within the Turkish labor
movement during the 1950s was the emergence of the Confederation of Turkish Labor
Unions (Türk-İş) as the first national confederation of labor unions in Turkey. 
21  Especially during its  early years,  the rhetoric utilized by leaders in Türk-İş  was not
militant and was generally in line with prevailing state concerns about limiting class
conflict. Toward this end, in its original governing laws, Türk-İş pledged not to organize
“in a religious manner and not to use philosophical beliefs and political propaganda in
struggle” (“Türk-İş’s Governing Laws, 1952,” 2002: 3). This was, in essence, a rejection of
political unionism, and especially of socialist and communist ideologies. Rather, Türk-İş
declared  itself  a  “nationalist  organization,”  independent  of  political  parties  and  the
government. According to its governing laws, the confederation would not be used in
political party propaganda or as a tool for spreading it, nor would it be “a tool for the
advancement of  foreign state ideologies” (ibid 2002:  4)  – code for the confederation’s
rejection of communism. 
22  Officials from both major political parties (the ruling Democrat Party and the opposition
Republican People’s Party) saw the emergence of Türk-İş as an opportunity to cut off any
militancy of rank-and-file union members and control the union movement through ties
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with its leadership. And both parties sought to tap into the emerging Turkish working
class as a source of electoral support. For example, the Democrat Party [Demokrat Partisi
(DP)]  aligned  with  Türk-İş  in  a  semi-corporatist  relationship,  whereby  in  return  for
popular support, the DP would pass legislation favorable to Türk-İş (and workers more
generally). In essence, in an effort to prevent political action based on class interests, the
state,  under the DP,  sought to control  and limit the political  action of working class
organizations. 
23 The DP’s  strategy  of  appealing  to  workers  was  one  that  sought  to  mobilize  popular
support  without  transforming  the  enduring  limits  and  controls  on  working  class
associations and therefore without transforming prevailing state views of the legitimacy
of  class based politics.  Throughout this  period,  the DP passed a number of  pieces of
legislation  designed  to  benefit  working  class  needs.  The  DP’s  legislation  benefiting
workers included: “paid weekends,  annual leave,  statutory bonuses,  extensions of the
scope of the Labour act and of social security, labor tribunals with a worker serving as
judge,  subsidized construction loans for workers,  [and a]  minimum wage” (Koç 1999:
36-37). At the same time, the DP repeatedly delayed and ultimately failed to act upon its
promises to expand union rights by legalizing strikes. 
24  Still, the Democrat Party was unable to achieve a lasting corporatist relationship with
Türk-İş.  In  the  late  1950s,  as  a  result  of  economic  hardships  and the  DP’s  enduring
support for constraints on working class rights and political participation, Türk-İş began
calling for the removal of legal obstacles to union growth and power. In particular, the
confederation sought the right to strike. A 1959 report from Türk-İş’s Representatives
Committee,  for  instance,  concluded,  “Nowhere  in  the  world  can  you  create  a  free
bargaining system where the right to strike isn’t realized” (2002: 198). Yet, these were far
from radical demands, as Türk-İş simply sought the means to engage in effective business
unionism. 
25  The military intervention of 27 May 1960 marked a critical juncture in Turkish politics
and thereby in Turkish state-labor relations. After ousting the ruling Democrat Party, the
Turkish military called upon a cohort of university professors to draft a new constitution
that would open up the political  system. The resulting constitution was dramatically
more liberal than the previous system of government. Empowered with new freedoms
and protected by greater  civil  liberties,  the next  two decades  would bring increased
political participation, as well as ideological polarization to Turkish political life. On the
labor  front,  the  new constitution  expanded  and  safeguarded  important  labor  rights,
including the right to organize, form unions, and to strike. These legal reforms, combined
with important changes within Turkish society associated with urbanization and rapid
industrialization  expanded  the  organizing  opportunities  for  labor  activists,  and
contributed to the growing importance of organized labor within Turkish politics.11 
26 Indeed, soon after the military intervention intellectuals and activists on the left began to
organize politically and within a host of left-wing publications. Within this context, the
presence of a growing voice within labor circles that was motivated by a more radical
agenda, as well as socialist and social-democratic ideas began to make itself known. This
first occurred on 13 February 1961, when a coalition of 12 labor union activists formed
the Turkish Workers’ Party [Türk İşçi Partisi (TİP)]. According to party literature, the open
market was harmful to Turkish interests because, as an underdeveloped country, Turkey
was being exploited in the free market for the benefit of more developed countries (TİP
Handbook 1964:  145).  Consequently,  TİP  activists  rejected  free  market  policies,  and
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promoted a political agenda that called for the greater state intervention on behalf of the
economic  interests  of  the  working  class  and  of  peasants.  Within  the  Turkish  labor
movement, differences began to emerge over this political agenda. While the leadership
of Türk-İş was wary of a radical political agenda, a growing number of labor activists were
being influenced by socialist and communist ideologies, and were, therefore, becoming
committed an alternative understanding of what types of actions were appropriate for
Turkish labor unions.12 
27 While it isn’t necessarily the focus of this article, my research on the development of the
labor  movement  in  Turkey  during  the  1960s  and  1970s  points  to  two  explanatory
variables that address the question of why some unionists found it worth their energy to
engage  in  more  radical  political  unionism and  some  did  not.  The  first  involves  the
position  of  workers  and  union  leaders  within  the  broader  structure  of  the  Turkish
economy, and the second highlights how particular moments of  contention (between
workers  and  industrial  elites;  between  workers  and  the  state;  and  between  workers
– eventually DİSK-affiliated unions – and Türk-İş) pushed some workers and labor leaders
toward a more radical political unionism. 
28 Indeed,  differences  within  the  Turkish  labor  movement  over  the  political  agenda  of
organized labor, and over the level of acceptable labor militancy, became increasingly
stark throughout the 1960s. In different studies of the Turkish labor movement, Robert
Bianchi (1984) and Toker Dereli (1968) have demonstrated that such differences within
unions and the subsequent inclination toward more militant political activism tended to
vary depending on the type of industry (state-run v. private), and the type of industry
management  (younger  managers,  older  paternalists,  and  commercial  profiteers).  In
general, during the early 1960s, those unions least inclined toward socialism and political
unionism – were  found  in  state  economic  enterprises.  These  unions  demonstrated  a
willingness to forego militancy and political unionism in favor of material benefits and
business unionism when the economy was good and such benefits were to be had, but
became more militant and explicitly political beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s
when the economy suffered and benefits diminished. On the other hand, during the early
1960s, unions most inclined toward socialist and/or social democratic political unionism
were located primarily in privately-owned industries. Figure 1presents an overview of
membership in public and private sector unions. 
 
Figure 1: Public Sector, Private Sector, and Total Union Membership, 1960-1980
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29 Those opposed to political unionism drew inspiration from their American counterparts.
This split became acute in late January and early February, 1964, when Türk-İş moved
toward the adoption of an official policy of remaining “above party politics” [partilerüstü
politika].13 From one point of view, the adoption of an “above party politics” stance was
inspired  by  TİP  and  the  uneasiness  of  some  Türk-İş  leaders  with  members  who
sympathized with the party. Halil Tunç, for example, said that he did not support TİP
because there needed to be “union consciousness” before political organization. “In those
years,” he recalled,  “you could find Justice Party unions,  CHP unions.” Consequently,
politics would have to wait until unions could be “independent from political parties”
(Koç 1989: 70).
30 Remaining nominally above party politics also made a good deal of strategic sense to
Türk-İş leaders, as it allowed the confederation to continue to force the parties in power
and in opposition to  compete for  its  support.  In  fact,  Türk-İş’s  leadership sought  to
capitalize on economic and political benefits that were promised by political parties that
sought to harness the electoral support of the working class. The leadership of Türk-İş
demonstrated  a  keen  awareness  of  the  potential  material  and  political  benefits  that
amicable ties to the dominant political party might elicit. That Türk-İş leaders’ strategies
(especially during the 1960s) were influenced by this set of incentive structures is evident
in  at  least  three  ways:  First,  through the  decision to  remain “above  party  politics.”
Second, recognizing the chance to enhance their material  and political goals,  Türk-İş
supported the Justice Party’s effort in the 1970 revisions to the laws governing union
representation. This legislation, which will be discussed at greater length below, required
a union to represent at least 1/3 of the workers in an industry in order to gain status as a
legal representative, strengthening the position of Türk-İş as the largest confederation of
labor unions in Turkey. Finally, the leadership of Türk-İş was careful to distance itself
from militant union actions. In particular, the leadership of the national confederation
moved to purge perceived socialist influences from the mine workers’ union responsible
for the wildcat strikes in 1965 and punished affiliated unions that offered support to
striking factory workers at the Paşabahçe Glassworks in 1966.14  
31 Thus, the second factor shaping the emergence of political radicalism results from the
way  in  which  particular  moments  of  contention  fostered  labor  militancy  within  a
segment of the Turkish labor movement. For these activists, the business unionism of
Türk-İş  failed to address the political and economic concerns of the Turkish working
class.  In the end,  despite a strategic environment where state actors were seemingly
providing the means for labor activists to achieve the goals of political inclusion and
enhanced material  benefits  if  they  were  willing  to  forego radical  ideas  and political
unionism,  efforts  to  incorporate  labor  unions  were  ultimately  unsuccessful.  For  a
significant and growing number of labor activists in Turkey, existing economic conditions
were clearly understood as unfair, and an in order to address these conditions a new an
alternative ideology for guiding union activity, with a concommitment alternative logic
of  appropriate  behavior  began  to  take  hold.  Consequently,  the  early  1960s  saw  the
emergence of an alternative form of unionism that provided activists with an alternative
basis of solidarity in political unionism and a rejection of the state’s (and, for that matter,
Türk-İş’s) interpretation of legitimate behavior for workers and unions. This split in the
Turkish  labor  movement  culminated  with  the  emergence  of  the  Confederation  of
Revolutionary Labor Unions [Devrimci İşçi Sendikası  Konfederasyonu (DİSK)] as a rival to
Türk-İş.
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32 The seeds of this split, first evident in the formation of the Turkish Workers’ Party, began
to grow following a  wildcat  strike  by  coalminers  in Zonguldak,  a  region toward the
Istanbul side of Turkey’s Black Sea coast. In 1965, approximately 46,000 people worked in
the region’s coal mines (Roy 1974: 143). In March of 1965 a wildcat strike over what were
perceived by workers as unfair changes in remuneration of bonus pay spread throughout
the region. As Delwin Roy recounts in his examination of the events that occurred in
Zonguldak from March 11-13, the strike began with 5,000 workers and spread from one
mine and shift to the next, ultimately encompassing most of the region’s 46,000 miners. 
33 While the “bread and butter” issue of pay provided the genesis for the strike, the strike
demonstrated a  growing rank-and-file  discontent  with existing social,  economic,  and
political  conditions,  and  with  the  more  moderate  strategies  advocated  by  Türk-İş’s
leadership. Toward this end, newspaper coverage of the strike highlighted the ways in
which workers’ understanding of the state’s culpability for their insufficient wages and
bad working conditions motivated both the initial work stoppage, and the continuance of
it even after deadly clashes with police and military forces. 
34 The leadership of the local union tried unsuccessfully to rein in the rank-and-file. Rather
than accepting legitimate motivations for the workers’ actions, union officials blamed
outside agitators for fomenting worker recalcitrance. According to the union leadership
(based on the statements from Türk-İş  president  Seyfi  Demirsoy,  Maden-İş  president
Kemal Özer, and the local union president Osman İpekçi) “the events in [Zonguldak] were
a provocation, and this provocation had an external origin” (Besen 1965: 1). Indeed, Özer
declared, “I don’t know who is responsible for this provocation. This, the security officials
will  certainly get to the middle of.  But,  that this was a provocation is 100% certain”
(Beşer, Besen, & Keklik 1965: 7).
35 That the union leadership neither supported nor controlled the militancy of the rank-
and-file  leads  us  to  two conclusions:  First,  it  highlights  the  different  motivations  of
various actors in the labor movement. As Nichols and Kahveci point out, “[Union leaders]
were insulated from the membership by their occupancy of permanent positions and they
adopted a  collaborative stance toward the state  appointed management” (1995:  201).
Second,  it  suggests  that  a  number  of  rank-and-file  Türk-İş  members  exhibited  a
willingness to engage in collective labor militancy. 
36  The  state’s response  to  the  coalminers’  wildcat  strike  in  Zonguldak represented an
important turning point in the development of Turkish labor history. Here, for the first
time  since  the  formation  of  Türk-İş,  the  Turkish  state  mobilized  its  full  repressive
apparatus in an effort to control labor activism. And here,  for one of the first  times
during this critical period, labor activists did not back down. In the clashes between the
military, police, and the workers, two workers were shot dead, many were wounded, and
forty-nine workers were arrested (Nichols and Kahveci 1995: 201). Moreover, the state
sought  to  repress  this  demonstration  of  labor  militancy,  and  marginalize  those
responsible for it.
37 Yet,  it  was  only  one  year  later,  when  the  leadership  of  Türk-İş  condemned  an
unauthorized strike in the Paşabahçe bottle and glass factory in Istanbul, that the full
split  within  the  Turkish  labor  movement  occurred.  This  dispute  between  the
confederation and the local union involved local factory workers’ demands on one side,
and the interests of Türk-İş to maintain industry-level bargaining on the other. On 31
January 1966 factory workers began a strike for better pay and working conditions. At a
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meeting in Ankara on the 21st of March, Türk-İş went over the head of the local union and
workers and negotiated a protocol that would allow the company to fire any worker who
had attacked the company, including union leaders. According to the protocol, workers
would not be paid for the period of the strike, but would receive a larger bonus when
work resumed. Local union workers and leaders refused to accept these terms and began
a factory occupation. On 6 April, a meeting was held by unions who opposed Türk-İş’s
decision  to  end  the  strike;  together  they  formed  the  Paşabahçe  Strike  Support
Committee.
38 Strikers  returned  to  work  on  23  April  after  a  state  injunction  ended  the  strike.  In
December, Türk-İş reprimanded and suspended those unions involved in the strike and
their main supporters.15 In many ways, this conflict proved to be the last straw for those
within the labor movement who favored socialist  ideas and more militant activism.16
According to Turkish labor activist, Kemal Sülker, “The Paşabahçe strike opened a new
road for development between unions. Türk-İş’s opposition to workers’ rights left the
strikers  stranded”  (1968:  112).17 On  15  January  1967,  representatives  from seventeen
unions met in Istanbul and began to lay the groundwork for breaking away from Türk-İş.
This conflict ultimately ended with these unions,  in addition to the construction and
bankers’  unions,  withdrawing  from  Türk-İş  and  forming  the  Confederation  of
Revolutionary Trade Unions (DİSK) on 13 February 1967.  Of  these events,  TİP leader,
Mehmet  Ali  Aybar,  explained,  “We went  forward with  the  dream of  creating  a  new
confederation. [We believed] that Türk-İş was of no use to unionists, that they were not of
the opinion to support workers’ rights. In the end . . . [it was] decided to form a new
confederation” (quoted in Beşeli 2002: 239).  
39 The formation of DİSK was driven by more than a difference in strategies to achieve
shared economic goals; it attests to the growth of a more politically radical Turkish labor
activism driven by an alternative set of values. The values that underpinned this activism
can be distilled, for example, from statements DİSK released upon its creation. Toward
this end, the confederation listed fifteen reasons for its breaking away from Türk-İş.  It is
worthwhile to consider a few of the most important. First, the decision to break away was
taken “Because Türk-İş is failing to apply with much effort the principles written in its
constitution and decided on in its congresses” (DİSK 1967: 5). In addition, DİSK claimed
that Türk-İş was failing to solve any of the important problems that workers faced. For
instance, Türk-İş had not been an effective advocate regarding tax policy for workers,
producers, farmers, or villagers (1967: 7).  Furthermore, Türk-İş was seen as advocating a
“politics that is contrary to social reality” (1967: 7-8). Citing financial support from the US
Agency for International Development,  DİSK concluded, “Türk-İş  has withdrawn from
national  independence,  and  stands  for  independence  with  American  help”  (1967:  9).
Subsequently, DİSK’s founders argued that Türk-İş’s ties to the US meant that its leaders
were getting educated in a politics that was contrary to the needs of the Turkish workers.
In  short,  DİSK  was  critical  of  Türk-İş’s  view  that  politics  was  a  distraction  and  an
impediment for workers (1967: 9-10). Finally, DİSK cited as justification for the split the
belief that “Türk-İş has come out against every justified strike” (1967: 11).18 
40 Taken together, these justifications mean that the decision to leave Türk-İş rested on the
belief that Turkish unions needed to be independent from foreign exploitation, defend
the rights of workers provided in the constitution, and improve the quality of life for the
working class. The existing labor organizations and the existing system of state-labor
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relations were seen as insufficient for addressing these concerns.  In order to achieve
these goals, “it was thought a true worker confederation’s creation” was needed (1967:
14).  The  founders  of  DİSK  believed  that,  “Our  confederation’s  strengthening  of  the
working class in the country’s administration will vanquish slavery and establish an order
with the goal of equality and brotherhood from every direction, and will guarantee that
the working class will play an influential role in [solving] the country’s problems” (1967:
16).
41 On the whole, whereas Turkish state actors (from the military to the dominant political
parties) had historically sought to prevent the emergence of a radical labor politics, the
formation of DİSK offered the Turkish working class a form of labor activism that valued
engagement in militant, political unionism.19 This alternative was premised on the belief
that current social relations were better understood through a socialist interpretation of
the salience of socioeconomic injustice and class antagonism on the one hand, and the
belief that active political action could address these injustices on the other. As Ilkay
Sunar summarizes, DİSK “subscribed to the radical view that the aim of the Turkish labor
movement ought to be political – that is to say: the reconstruction of society rather than
simply improved welfare within the bounds of the existing system” (1974: 164).
42 Further evidence of the values that underpinned DİSK activists’ conduct are revealed in
the confederation’s understanding of what it meant to be “revolutionary.” Revolution,
according to  DİSK’s  founders,  involved:  a  revolution in nourishment,  a  revolution in
housing (water and electricity as a basic right), a revolution in health (availability of and
access  to  medical  care  as  a  political  issue),  a  revolution in  education (“We want  all
workers to be able to read and write”), a revolution in work (ending unjust power over
workers, inequality faced by women and child laborers, allowing public sector unions,
providing  jobs  for  everyone),  a  revolution  in  national  income,  a  revolution  in  taxes
(lowering  taxes  for  the  working  and  productive  classes),  a  revolution  in  workers’
production, a revolution in freedom from debts, and revolution in organization (DİSK,
1967: 21-28).  “This is our revolutionism,” DİSK’s founders declared, “changing today’s
conservative, regressive economic, social, and political relations in accordance with the
constitution  .  .  .  .  Revolutionism,  so  that  everyone  can  own property  and  unionism
working to guarantee the possibility of equally benefiting from civilization’s blessings”
(1967: 31).
43 In  the end,  DİSK’s  founders  articulated six  objectives  or  fundamental  principles  that
guided  its  labor  activism  during  the  late  1960s  and  1970s:  First,  a  planned,  statist
economic system that was independent from foreign influence could solve working class
problems.  Second,  the state should take a greater role in controlling and developing
heavy industries  and other  key financial  industries.  Third,  the state  ought  to  play a
greater  role  in  assuring  living  standards  and  protecting  the  unemployed.  Fourth,
domestic and international events must be evaluated from a “scientific” viewpoint in
order to raise a revolutionary working class consciousness. Fifth, there ought to be land
reform that improves the living condition of rural populations and helps the unemployed.
Finally, labor rights should not just involve economic or professional struggle: “In order
to use the democratic rights that are in the constitution, political struggle, too, is needed”
(1967: 32).
44 Membership numbers for Turkish labor unions are notoriously difficult to report with
accuracy.  It  is  widely  acknowledged  that  Turkish  labor  laws  encouraged  the  over-
reporting  of  membership  numbers.  Consequently,  what  estimates  are  available  often
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vary. Nonetheless, DİSK, whose membership started around 67,000 in 1967 expanded to
approximately 500,000 by 1980. By way of comparison, Türk-İş reported a membership of
497,857 in 1967, and an increase to 700,000 dues paying members by 1976. Defections
from Türk-İş to DİSK between 1970 and 1973 contributed to a dramatic increase in DİSK’s
membership from 88,650 to 270,000.20 
45 The hallmark of DİSK’s activism was its willingness to explicitly challenge both Türk-İş
and the state’s understanding of legitimate action by advocating political unionism and
militant  workplace  actions.  Toward  this  end,  in  its  election  statement  for  the  1969
elections, DİSK announced its support for TİP, “Because the Turkish Workers’ Party is the
only party that will bring the working people to power” (DİSK, 1970:1). According to DİSK,
“Only the Turkish Workers’ Party accepts the struggle for a second independence against
American imperialism, only TİP is working for a Turkey without an influence from a
foreign state, only TİP offers a foreign policy of independence from the blocs” (1970: 2).
46  As one could have predicted, the main political parties’ reaction to DİSK activism was to
seek ways to harness the electoral support of the working class, while simultaneously
stifling the growth of political unionism. Indeed, social science theory tells us that when
labor mobilization comes to challenge the state, state actors will be more likely to move
to  co-opt  and/or  repress  labor.21 Of  the  important  legislative  changes  designed  to
increase workers’ rights and material conditions can be counted the Social Security Law
of  1964,  legislation granting state  civil  servants  the  right  to  unionize  (also  in  1964),
minimum wage legislation (in 1972), and legislation targeting improvements in workers’
health and job security (in 1974).22 Moreover, according to Bianchi, especially after the
emergence of DİSK:
The government became more willing to grant official  recognition to [Türk-İş’s]
claims.  Türk-İş  leaders  were  commonly  accepted  as  labor’s  exclusive
representatives in  mixed consultative  board and regulatory  commissions  in  the
State Planning Organization, the Minimum Wage Commission, the State Economic
Enterprises, the National Productivity Council, the Turkish Standards Institute, and
in ad hoc consultative committees preparing labor legislation (1984: 126).
47 As Koç points out,  these changes are better understood as an effort to influence and
control  the  growth  of  the  Turkish  labor  movement,  rather  than  simply  a  series  of
concessions (2003: 106).
48  Efforts to gain union support did, in turn, shape the willingness of certain labor leaders
and activists to cooperate with the state. This was particularly true in the case of Türk-
İş’s support for Law No. 1317, the 1970 labor law revisions proposed by the ruling Justice
Party. The most important features of this legislation involved new restrictions on the
ability  of  unions  and  union  confederations  to  be  legal  representatives,  easing  of
requirements needed to leave a union, new restrictions defining which workers had the
legal right to organize, and new restrictions defining the time a worker must work in a
work place in order to be eligible to form a union. DİSK and TİP activists argued that the
intention  of  these  changes  was  specifically  to  limit  the  activities  and organizational
abilities of its unions—an intention, they argued, that was revealed in public remarks
prior to the law’s  passage and in the parliamentary debate.  In fact,  during the floor
debate on the legislation, one Member of Parliament all but made this connection, saying
the legislation was needed because, “TİP is Marxist and Leninist, not Atatürkist. TİP and
DİSK are on the side of violence and tyranny” (quoted in Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi
1996: 451). 
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49 Adoption of these legal changes inspired massive protests organized by Istanbul factory
workers. On the morning of 15 June 1970, 70,000 workers took to the streets in opposition
to these new regulations governing labor unions. Though the actions were sponsored by
DİSK, workers affiliated with Türk-İş  unions joined in solidarity, with one union even
threatening to withdraw from Türk-İş if the confederation failed to withdraw support for
the legal changes (Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi 1996: 453). The two day protests were
met with military and police repression, and on 16 June, with the declaration of martial
law. These restrictions were accompanied by the closure of TİP on 10 July 1971, as well as
other legal  and constitutional changes that restricted union rights and freedoms – in
particular the rights of civil servants and teachers to form unions.23
50 Again, the Turkish state demonstrated its willingness and capacity to mobilize repressive
force, rather than concede to militant union actions. Yet, driven as they were by their
ideological values and beliefs, Turkish labor activists who were committed to a vision of
socialism and labor radicalism did not turn away from political unionism. In fact, the
1970s in Turkey was marked by an increasingly confrontational political environment. It
was an environment in which clashes between the police, ultra-nationalist groups, and
labor  activists  grew  in  frequency  and  intensity.  It  was  an  environment  in  which  a
commitment to political unionism persisted despite state repression and social counter-
mobilization, and despite limited success in achieving policy goals.
51 Indeed, partially in response to the growing attraction of workers to DİSK, and partially
in response to the declining ability of the state to offer material benefits during periods of
economic hardship, some among the leadership of Türk-İş took on a more favorable view
of political unionism. This process began during the 1969 Türk-İş convention, at which a
more leftist mission was adopted, including the call for a 45 hour work week, collective
bargaining rights for all workers, 20-40 days paid leave for workers, and the support for
nine of its members as candidates for elected office. The influence of political unionism
within Türk-İş  was accelerated,  however,  in January,  1971,  when four Türk-İş  unions
issued a report criticizing the confederation’s enduring support for remaining “above
party politics.” This initial report gained the support of seven additional unions, and was
followed by a second report calling for a social democratic order for the Turkish labor
movement. 
52 While this project was intended as an alternative to DİSK unionism and not universally
accepted within Türk-İş, it did spur the growth of social-democratic activism and force a
decade-long challenge to increase the confederation’s acceptance of political unionism.24
Toward this  end,  as  Halil  Tunç  emerged as  the  President  of  Türk-İş,  he  “eventually
became convinced that Türk-İş had to organize a political counteroffensive against new
threats to union freedoms and to democracy itself” (Bianchi, 1984: 220). Consequently,
during the 1970s, Turkish labor activism, on the whole embodied more of the values and
ideas that had originally led to the emergence of DİSK, as it sought to address working
class concerns and protect working class rights of association through militant actions,
strikes, and demonstrations despite the persistence of state repression.
53 Furthermore,  the  emergence  of  a  more  militant  and  political  unionism  in  Turkey
contributed  to and benefited  from significant  transformations  within  major  political
parties. Perhaps the most important change was the CHP’s move toward a left-of-center
stance in 1966. Amid the climate of labor activism, and under the leadership of Bülent
Ecevit, the CHP evolved into a self-defined left-of-center party. Ecevit himself suggests
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that the source and debate about the decision to embrace a left-of-center stance began
after  the  1965  parliamentary  elections,  and  included  a  program of  land  reform,  tax
reform,  advocacy  for  greater  democratic  rights  for  workers,  and  laws  against  the
exploitation of labor (1973b: 16). As Ilkay Sunar points out, the new CHP still maintained a
commitment to populism “defined in terms of a commitment to integration, mobilization,
and  development”  (1974:  177).  The  key  difference,  though,  was  the  reformed  CHP’s
version of populism embraced the salient concerns of the working class.25 Explaining his
support for the shift to the left, Ecevit writes, “One of the characteristics of the period
that followed the revolution of 27 May 1960, in Turkey, is the emergence of labor as a new
social and political force” (1973a: 151).  According to Ecevit, “This healthy development in
the labor movement made possible by the democratization of Turkey, has contributed, in
turn, to the strengthening of democracy in Turkey. Trade unions are now among the
chief bulwarks of democracy in Turkey” (1973a: 174). 
54 Though the shift  toward a left-of-center stance began after 1965,  its  supporters fully
consolidated their dominance of the party only in May 1972 when Ecevit was elected the
party’s leader. After 1972, Ecevit described the party as democratic left; its ideology as
populist and democratic (Ayata 1992:  87).  The political  and economic program of the
party was not a rejection of capitalism, but sought to reform Turkey’s market economy in
line with European social-democratic parties. This included the broader goals of social
security for all working people, unemployment assistance, and health insurance for all
citizens (Ayata 1992: 89-90). 
55 Consequently,  the  pursuit  of  a  social-democratic  agenda  and  working  class  alliances
became an important pillar for the CHP throughout the 1970s, contributing to the CHP’s
electoral success in 1973 and 1977 (Keyder 1987: 57).26  Toward this end, while actively
and consistently opposing the political agenda of the right, DİSK actively supported the
Republican  People’s  Party  in  the  1977  general  elections.  DİSK’s  electoral  concerns
included:  freedom of  thought,  organization,  and expression in Turkey comparable to
what other European countries enjoy; freedom for workers to choose the union that they
want; an end to lockouts; the rights to organize, bargain collectively, and strike for all
workers and civil servants; unemployment insurance; wage equality for women workers;
social security for all workers; a fair tax system for all workers; protections for Turkish
workers  abroad;  an  end  to  the  extraordinary  power  of  the  State  Security  Courts;
democratization of the regulations regarding martial law; May Day as a state holiday; an
end to limits on the right to strike; an end to all limits on democratic rights and freedoms
(especially those imposed after the 12 March 1971 military intervention); and an end to
the  influence  of  the  United  States  and  NATO  on  Turkish  politics  (DİSK  1977:  5-7).
Moreover,  DİSK  was  increasingly  concerned  that  the  exploitation  of  workers  was
becoming easier with the rise of  a “fascist  order.” In such a political  climate,  it  was
thought  opponents  of  the  labor  movement  “will  want  to  prohibit  even the  smallest
strikes by citing [concerns for] ‘national security’” (DİSK 1977: 3). For DİSK, in order to
advance this agenda and counteract these trends, the decision was made “to support the
closest party to these concerns in the 1977 general election, the CHP” (DİSK 1977: 4).
56 Subsequently,  throughout  the  1970s,  electoral  trends  indicate  a  correlation  between
electoral support for the CHP and the rise of support provided by the labor movement.
While it is difficult to show with absolute certainty that the CHP’s embracing of a party
platform and ideology that  reflected the concerns expressed by the labor movement
entirely  explain  the  party’s  increased  electoral  success,  there  is  a  clear  correlation
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between its electoral support before and after gaining labor movement support. In fact,
the CHP increased its percentage of the popular vote from 27.4% in 1969 to 33.3% in 1973
and 41.4% in 1977. Moreover, the increased electoral support in both elections provided
the CHP with the largest number of seats in parliament, giving the party the opportunity
to lead the formation of a coalition government. Furthermore, the CHP was particularly
successful  within working class  and poor neighborhoods in larger cities.  In the poor
gecekondu neighborhoods of Izmir and Istanbul, for example, the CHP’s vote increased
from 22.6% and 21.8% in 1969 to 44.2% and 47.5% in 1973 (Ayata1991: 91). Furthermore,
between the years 1969-1973, there was a dramatic shift away from electoral support for
the Justice Party [Adalet Partisi (AP)] in the coal mining regions of Zonguldak, with gains
going mostly to the CHP. Specifically, the AP’s vote declined from 55.6% to 38.2%, while
the CHP’s increased to 39.8% from 30.7%, and in 1977 the CHP’s vote increased further, to
45.7% (Sayarı & Esmer 2002: 201-205.) 
57 The military coup that occurred in September of 1980 put a dramatic end to the broader
climate of ideological confrontation, and ushered in a much more constrained political
environment. The dramatic change in the broader political contexts also changed the
nature of  labor  activism in Turkey.  In  many ways,  the stark ideological  and tactical
differences that divided the Turkish labor movement in the 1960s and 1970s disappeared
in favor  of  a  more  unified  labor  movement  in  the  decades  since.  Whereas  the  1960
military coup sought  to open up the political  system,  the 1980 military intervention
specifically sought to promote stability by depoliticizing society and ending the era of
ideological confrontation. In the months that followed the military’s intervention, the
National Security Council demonstrated how harshly labor unions would be treated: three
confederations were closed; compulsory arbitration replaced collective bargaining; and
the right to strike was suspended.  In addition, nearly two thousand labor activists from
DİSK were arrested, many spent years in prison waiting for their trials to be heard.27
Furthermore, just as the new constitution restricted civil rights and liberties, so too the
new law covering organized labor (Law Number 2822) restricted the scope of legal strikes.
28
58 Without a partner in the state and as a result of the thorough repression of the most
extreme leftwing ideologues, what emerged in the 1980s and 1990s was a labor movement
that,  although still  organizationally fractured, was far more unified than ever before.
According  to  Yıldırım Koç,  in  the  1980s  there  were  two main bases  for  cooperation
between union confederations:  the state’s  effort  to control  radical  labor reduced the
ideological differences between the major confederations, and the 1990s economic crises
provided material incentives for unified collective action.29 Thus, collaboration between
the  major  union  confederations  was  focused  both  on  securing  changes  to  the  legal
restrictions imposed by the 1982 constitution and post-coup legal environment, as well
on organizing opposition to the state’s privatization reforms and capitulations to the
institutions of neo-liberal globalization. 
59 Moreover, though some of the radicalism of the past may not have been brought forward,
labor activism since 1980 has been, at times, every bit as political and confrontational as
it  was  in  the  past.  In  addition  to  joint  efforts  to  promote  labor’s  opposition  to  the
privatization  of  state-owned industries  in  particular,  and neo-liberal  globalization  in
general, the various organizations within the Turkish labor movement have jointly held
large and confrontational  rallies  and protests  on May Day.  Clearly,  the narrowing of
divisions within the Turkish labor movement indicates that the broader political  and
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ideological context that underpins labor activism today is different from those of the
1960s and 1970s. Still, I believe the divergences within prior labor activism are important
both  to  our  understanding  of  Turkish  politics,  and  to  our  understanding  of  social
movements more generally. Moreover, despite greater levels of cooperation, competition
within the Turkish labor movement continues. For example, in May and June 2004, the
DİSK-affiliated Birleşik Metal  İş  issued a formal complaint to the International  Labor
Organization about raids on its unions by the metal workers’ union affiliated with Türk-
İş, Türk Metal İş. According to one of these complaints, on the night of 11 March 2004,
third shift workers at a factory in Gebze, “were locked in the factory till next morning
and then they were forced to resign from our Union and to register to another Union.”30
Such incidents demonstrate that competition between union confederations still shapes
the Turkish labor movement. 
 
Conclusion
60 Rationalist explanations that focus on the strategic, cost-benefit calculus of individuals
are insuffiencient for explaining the split  within the Turkish labor movement in the
1960s. From a distance, it seems irrational and counterproductive for schisms to divide
labor movements. Turkey is an especially prescient example: in a nation with an over-
supply of cheap labor, with an historic hostility to class-based organization, and with
concerted industrial opposition to unionization, it seems self-evident that a united labor
movement  would be  preferential  to  a  divided one.  Furthermore,  this  divide  and the
persistence of  militant activism seems paradoxical  when various Turkish state actors
demonstrated a willingness to repress radical labor activism, and at the same time to
offer positive incentives for labor activists who rejected militant activism. Throughout
the narrative provided above, I allude to instances of repression. Presumably, when faced
with the types of  negative incentives  embodied by these instances  of  repression,  we
would expect to see labor activists willing to moderate their activities – or at least to see
the free rider problem become more difficult to overcome. On the contrary, some of the
largest and most contentious collective action in the Turkish labor movement took place
after these moments of repression. 
61 Structural explanations are also insufficient for explaining this split;  while large-scale
structural transformations provided the conditions that allowed for the growth of the
Turkish labor movement (i.e. urbanization and industrialization, as well as the opening of
legal opportunities to organize), as scholars who study social movements have pointed
out, these structural conditions must be interpreted by political actors. Indeed, despite
facing  similar  structural  conditions,  a  clear  split  emerged  within  the  Turkish  labor
movement. Yet, this split can be easily explained by taking seriously the role of ideology
in shaping collective action, or the varying the logic of appropriateness resulting from
alternative institutions. 
62 Analytically, there are three comparative implications we can draw from this analysis of
the  divergence  in  the  Turkish  labor  movement.  First,  one  of  the  most  important
implications  of  this  split  in  Turkish  labor  activism  is  what  it  implies  about  the
relationship  between repression  and labor  movements.  The  point  I’m making  is  not
necessarily  new;  others  have noted the way repression can help sustain rather  than
undermine  activists’  commitment  to  direct  action.31 However,  I  hope  to  clarify  our
analysis  of  when and  how repression  shapes  movement  activism by  suggesting  that
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repression is less likely to moderate movement rhetoric and action when activists are
motivated  by  alternative  ideologies,  and  new  institutional  logics  of  appropriateness
underpin collective action. 
63 Second, the history of labor activism in Turkey demonstrates that such schisms in labor
movements have important and enduring consequences, especially when they involve a
divergence in types of social conduct.  Indeed, differences within the labor movement
have been cited by some as part of the explanation for the inability of the Turkish labor
movement to withstand the massive repression it suffered with the 12 September 1980
military coup.  Ahmet Samim (1987),  for  instance,  sees  the factional  conflict  between
socialists,  communists,  and social  democrats  that  emerged in  Turkish labor  activism
during the 1970s as  a  waste of  resources that  contributed to the failure to generate
enough popular support to resist repression. “Instead of demonstrating that there were
rational and reachable alternatives to the urgent – and obviously social problems of every
day life,” he laments, “Turkish socialists offered voluminous debates on whether or not
the ‘Theory of Three Worlds’ was opportunist” (1987: 170). 
64 Finally, this analysis of the schism in Turkish labor politics has implications for the way
we examine the importance of ideologies in the context of rationalist analyses. The case
of the Turkish labor movement confirms that, in fact, ideological motivations ought to be
an important component of our analysis of the choices made by activists. It suggests, for
example,  that  we  take  seriously  the  analysis  of  how  activists’  values  can  inform
movement strategies, actions, and goals. Moreover, this study suggests that we can better
tell exactly how ideas matter by focusing on how activists act in ways that defy simple
cost-benefit calculations. 
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feedback on this article, particularly in helping to clarify the larger analytical framework. 
1.  State incorporation captures the situation where few autonomous labor organizations exist
prior  to  the  state’s  construction of  them.  State  incorporation is  often less  tolerant  of  leftist
unionism. Party incorporation often involves concessions to labor organizations and a greater
tolerance for the left. They identify three types of party incorporation: electoral, which involves
the incorporation of labor by existing parties; labor populism, where new parties draw on labor;
and  radical  populism,  where  peasants,  as  well  as  labor  organizations  are  incorporated  into
politics (Collier & Collier, 1991: 746).
2.  Critics  of  Olson’s  original  framing of  collective action problems,  of  course,  point out that
solidarity incentives (including reputation and the benefits obtained through shared identity
formation)  may  be  as,  or  more  important  in  explaining  social  movement  activism.  See,  for
example, Chong (1991) McAdam (2004). Lichbach (1995) also builds upon Olson’s original framing
of collective action problems in addressing the rebel’s dilemma: to rebel (and get others to join
you), or not to rebel.
3.  See, for example, Della Porta and Diani (1999: 240).
4.  Murillo, rightly, suggests that we need to take a broader view of militancy – focusing on more
than just strikes, especially as repertoires of contentious politics change. She cites, for example,
streaking during a protest at a Ford plant in Mexico in 1992. 
5.  Promoting labor activism is a goal of the state’s because it represents one way for a state to
mobilize  compliance,  participation,  and  legitimation.  Consequently,  state-sponsored  labor
activism  can  lower  the  transaction  costs  for  enforcing  rules  by  diffusing  enforcement
mechanisms and tying parts of  the population into nationalist  ideology – a cognitive schema
through which people make sense of their world.  See, for example, North (1981: 48-49).
6.  Labor autonomy is defined here as “a relational term resulting from the respective power
capacities of union and state actors” (Epstein 1989: 278). 
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7.  I am grateful to Arda Ibikoğlu and Tuna Kuyucu for warning me that this may be an unfair
assumption to make about the preferences of labor activist in general. Perhaps, they suggest, this
is a characterization that fits mainly with the experience of the American labor movement. While
this concern is fair, my interactions with Turkish labor activists lead me to believe it is at least a
fair assumption to make about many within Turkish labor unions today.
8.  History shows this to be the case for both democratic and Communist regimes. 
9.  In  this  analysis  the  primary  focus  is  on  DİSK,  but  the  emergence  of  two  other  labor
confederations during the 1970s (one tied to the nationalist right – MİSK, and one tied to Islamist
politics – Hak-İş) further reflects this period of ideological and institutional contestation. 
10.  For a full consideration of the early history of Turkish labor activism, see chapter three of
Mello (2006). 
11.  Concerning the structural changes taking place within the Turkish society and economy,
Feroz Ahmad states: “By the end of the 1960s, the character of Turkey’s economy and society had
changed almost beyond recognition. Before the 1960s, Turkey had been predominantly agrarian
with a small industrial sector dominated by the state. By the end of the decade, a substantial
private industrial sector had emerged so much so that industry’s contribution to the GNP almost
equaled that of agriculture, overtaking it in 1973. This was matched by rapid urbanization as
peasants flocked to the towns and cities in search of jobs and a better way of life” (1993: 134).
12.  Certainly, the emergence of leftist activism within Turkish politics and within the Turkish
labor movement were not unique during this time period. Zürcher, for example, highlights how
the emergence of the leftist student activism, leftist labor activism, leftist intellectual debates
and periodicals, and leftist politics in Turkey in general, occurred at the same time as, and was
often  influenced  by  similar  movements  in  France,  Germany,  and  the  United  States  (2004:
253-256).
13.  The actual implication of this stance was not a complete avoidance of political concerns. In
fact, in the 1965 general elections Türk-İş published a blacklist in Milliyet Gazetesi that opposed
ten candidates for parliament. Despite the efforts of Türk-İş’s leadership to stress their support
for  what  would  benefit  the  Turkish  people  and  not  just  the  working  class,  this  action  was
opposed by the state, and on 18 August 1965 the 3rd Court of Justice in Ankara issued a warrant
for the police to search the Türk-İş building; 100 campaign books were confiscated in the search.
Then, on 28 August 1965 three Türk-İş representatives were arrested in Tokat during a campaign
stop. In the end, the confederation was acquitted of any wrong-doing,  and only three of the
candidates that it had opposed were re-elected (Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi 1996: 334). 
14.  See, for example, Bianchi, (1984 : 216).
15.  Petrol-İş and Kristal-İş were suspended from the confederation for fifteen months; Maden-İş
for six; and Basın-İş for three. 
16.  The punishment of strike supporters followed the failure to support striking coal miners in
March, 1965 and the prohibiting of TİP-supported unionists from taking part in the 7-14 March,
1966 Türk-İş convention (Beşeli 2002: 239).
17.  Sülker was a former general secretary of DİSK. 
18.  Among the litany of strikes specifically cited are the 1965 Zonguldak strike and, of course,
the Paşabahçe strike.
19.  One exception to this was Bülent Ecevit.  As the Labor Minister for the CHP government
following the 1960 military intervention, Ecevit coordinated the effort to develop and implement
the new laws governing labor relations and providing unions the right to strike. 
20.  See, for example, (“Türk-İş’e üye Kuruluşlar” 2002: 160-164); and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
“Türk-İş”  and  “DİSK,”  http://www.fes.de/fulltext/bueros/istanbul/00253003.htm#LOCE9E3
(accessed Oct. 20, 2005).
21.  See, for example, Murillo (2001); Epstein (1989); and Collier and Collier (1991).
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22.  For a complete list of legislative changes regarding working class and union concerns, see,
Koç (2003: 103-106).
23.  The party’s  support  for  class-based politics,  as  well  as  its  growing emphasis  on Kurdish
political rights, contributed to the decision to close TİP. 
24.  In  fact,  just  as  it  had  prohibited  TİP members  from  taking  part  in  the  1966  Türk-İş
convention, at the 1973 convention in Ankara, supporters of social democratic unionism were
kept out. This contributed to the decision of four unions to leave the confederation and join DİSK:
Genel-İş (1975), OLEYİS (1977), Ges-İş (1975), and Çağdaş Metal İş (1973) (Beşeli 2002: 240-241).
And, at the 10th Türk-İş  convention in 1976, 2/3 of those present supported a change to the
‘above  party  politics’  principle.  Nonetheless,  leadership  opposition  prevented  a  change  from
coming to fruition (Türkiye Sendikacılık Ansiklopedisi 1996: 340).
25.  Sunar writes, “The new populism was designed to appeal to the growing mood of discontent,
especially among the low-paid public employees, urban service workers, small shopkeepers and
artisans, poor peasants, and unemployed” (1974: 180). As Ayşe Güneş Ayata emphasizes, “The left
of center movement in 1966 claimed a much different ideology of populism than the populism of
the 1930s” (1992: 83). 
26.  Perhaps, though, one should be careful not to ascribe too much to this recognition of class
activism. Thus, Berik and Bilginsoy (1996: 46) point out that the CHP remained largely ambivalent
toward DİSK. 
27.  Of these arrests, Koç writes: “The majority of them suffered torture of various degrees. The
martial law military public prosecutor requested the execution of 78 leaders, imprisonment of
1399 and the liquidation of the trade unions and DİSK” (1999: 64). 
28.  For example,  Dereli  points  out that  under the legal  changes,  “a lawful  strike or lockout
deemed likely to endanger public health or national security may be suspended for sixty days by
government order and taken to compulsory arbitration at the end of that period” (1992: 472.) 
29.  Personal interview at Yol-İş national headquarters in Ankara, 22 April 2004.
30.  “Violations  of  Trade  Union  Rights  in  Colakoğlu  Metalurji  A.S.  in  Turkey,”  unpublished
complaint to the ILO/Committee on Freedom of Association.
31.  See, for example, Della Porta and Diani (1999: 211) and Earl (2003).
ABSTRACTS
In the mid-1960s, a schism split the Turkish labor movement into two confederations. One, the
Confederation  of  Turkish  Labor  Unions  (Türk-İş)  continued  to  pursue  a  path  that  rejected
militant activism and radical ideologies in favor of an American-inspired business unionism. The
other,  the  Revolutionary  Confederation of  Labor  Unions  (DİSK),  criticized  Türk-İş’s  policy  of
remaining “above party politics,” embracing both a radical socialist ideology, and organizing the
most  militant  actions  in  Turkish  labor  history.  This  paper  explores  why  these  two
confederations, facing the same set of incentive structures and background structural conditions
adopted radically different courses of action. I seek to explain the split within the Turkish labor
movement in the 1960s by focusing on how alternative ideologies emerged within the Turkish
labor movement, in conjunction with alternative institutions. Insofar as the existing economic
policies and the regime of labor relations in Turkey was increasingly seen as unfair, the founding
members of DİSK developed a counter ideology characterized by a more radical political agenda
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that called for greater direct action on the part of Turkish workers. What emerged in Turkey was
an ideologically fragmented labor movement where different institutions maintained (at times)
distinct goals for the political and economic development of Turkey, distinct conceptions of the
role labor unions should play politically, and as a result, different levels of collective political
action.
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